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NOTE
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE MONTANA
SUBDIVISION AND PLATTING ACT IN FLORENCE-
CARLTON
Jean E. Wilcox
Loopholes in the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act' have
been a problem for local governments since the act's inception. In
Florence-Carlton School District v. Board of Ravalli County Com-
missioners,' the Montana Supreme Court adopted a rule of con-
struction that will significantly affect future challenges to the use
of the act's many loopholes by land developers. This note discusses
Florence-Carlton's impact on local government subdivision review,
as well as its potential effect on interpretations of other provisions
of the subdivision act and other legislation enacted for the promo-
tion of the public's health, safety, and general welfare.
I. THE AMBIGUITY IN THE ACT
The act requires different review procedures for two types of
subdivisions-summary subdivisions and major subdivisions. Sum-
mary subdivisions are defined as divisions of land into five or fewer
lots. 3 Divisions of land into more than five lots are major subdivi-
sions.4 Proposed major subdivisions are reviewed more thoroughly
by the local governing body in a two-stage procedure.5 The devel-
oper of a major subdivision first submits a preliminary plat and, if
preliminary approval is granted, he then submits a final plat for
review. In reviewing the preliminary plat, the governing body uses
information provided in an environmental assessment, a public
1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 76-3-101 through -614
(1979).
2. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d 602 (1978).
3. Defined in MCA § 76-3-505 (1979) and in the Administrative Rules of Montana §
22-2.4B(2) - S410(1)(e)(ii) [hereinafter cited as A.R.M.].
4. MCA § 76-3-104 (1979). The term "subdivision" in general is defined in MCA § 76-
3-103 (1979) as a.
division of land or land so divided which creates one or more parcels containing
less than 20 acres, exclusive of public roadways, in order that the title to or posses-
sion of the parcels may be sold, rented, leased, or otherwise conveyed and shall
include any resubdivision and shall further include any condominium or area, re-
gardless of its size, which provides or will provide multiple space for recreational
camping vehicles, or mobile homes.
5. MCA §§ 76-3-601 through -608, -611 (1979).
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hearing, planning board recommendations, and a determination
that the development would be in the public interest.' To deter-
mine the public interest, the governing body weighs eight criteria:
the basis of the need for the subdivision; expressed public opinion;
and effects on agriculture, local services, taxation, the natural en-
vironment, wildlife, and public health and safety.7 Summary sub-
divisions, such as those involved in Florence-Carlton, require less
exacting public review. For example, summary subdivisions need
not be reviewed at a public hearing or be accompanied by an envi-
ronmental assessment.' In addition, no provision in the subdivision
act or in the administrative regulations promulgated under it by
the Department of Community Affairs expressly requires that sum-
mary subdivisions serve the public interest.
The uncertainty of whether summary subdivisions are required
to be in the public interest stems from the piece-meal legislative
history of the act. The act was adopted in 1973 and was substan-
tially amended in 1975 and 1977. The original provision setting out
the procedure for reviewing subdivisions began with the phrase,
"[e]xcept where a plat is eligible for summary approval, the subdi-
vider shall present to the governing body. . .the preliminary plat
of the proposed subdivision for local review."' The remaining sub-
sections concerned procedures for preliminary plats and made no
further mention of summary subdivision review requirements. In
1975, the legislature added subsection (4),1' which requires a deter-
mination of public interest using the eight criteria cited above. The
1977 amendment added subsection (6)," which provides an abbre-
viated review procedure for subdivisions of five or fewer parcels.
Because subsection (6) was the only portion of the original R.C.M.
1947, § 11-386611 that concerned summary subdivisions and be-
cause the entire section was introduced with an exception for sum-
mary subdivisions, whether the amendment requiring a public in-
terest determination also applied to summary subdivisions was not
clear.
II. THE CASE
Florence- Carlton concerned the adequacy of less exacting re-
6. Id.
7. MCA § 76-3-608(2) (1979).
8. MCA § 76-3-609 (1979).
9. REVISED ComES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 11-3866,
now codified at MCA § 76-3-601 (1979).
10. Now codified at MCA § 76-3-608 (1979).
11. Now codified at MCA § 76-3-609 (1979).
12. Now codified at MCA § 76-3-601 (1979).
[Vol. 41
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view requirements for a group of summary subdivisions within a
larger tract of land. In June 1977, Wilbur Hensler, a Ravalli
County rancher, divided his ranch into a number of parcels, each
of which was larger than twenty acres. This initial division of land
was exempt from review as a subdivision. However, shortly after
the survey was filed, Hensler sold the group of tracts to several
Missoula businessmen who resold them to individual buyers. In
1978, the new buyers proposed to further subdivide their tracts into
twenty-six subdivisions, each containing five lots. Although each
subdivision technically met the definition of a summary subdivi-
sion, the cumulative effect of the twenty-six subdivisions resem-
bled a major subdivision. Nevertheless, in considering the plat ap-
plications for the entire group of subdivisions, the Ravalli County
Planning Board decided that the group of summary subdivisions
did not require a public hearing, an environmental assessment, or a
determination of public interest. Consequently, the board recom-
mended approval of the subdivisions to the Ravalli County com-
missioners. Anticipating a detrimental impact on its already over-
crowded school, the Florence-Carlton School District filed suit
challenging the board's decision that a determination of public in-
terest was not required in order to approve the subdivisions. The
district court ruled in favor of the planning board, and the school
district appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
In spite of the technical interpretations advanced by all par-
ties, the Montana Supreme Court looked beyond the individual
sections of the act in question and examined the purpose section
which originally read:
It is the purpose of this act to promote the public health, safety,
and general welfare by regulating the subdivision of land; to pre-
vent overcrowding of land; to lessen congestion in the streets and
highways; to provide for adequate light, air, water supply, sewage
disposal, parks and recreation areas, ingress and egress and other
public requirements; to encourage development in harmony with
the natural environment .... 3
Amendments to the purpose section, made simultaneously with the
amendments to the original R.C.M. 1947, § 11-386611 in 1975 and
1977, suggested to the court that approval of a subdivision, whether
major or summary, is contingent upon a written finding of public
interest by the governing body. 5
In the same chapter to the session laws that established the
13. Originally codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3860.
14. Now codified at MCA § 76-3-601 (1979).
15. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d at 6D5.
1980]
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requirement for a determination of public interest, the legislature
amended the purpose section in 1975 "to require that approval of
any subdivision be contingent upon a written finding of public in-
terest by the governing body."" In 1977, the purpose section was
again amended "to require whenever necessary, the appropriate ap-
proval of subdivisions be contingent upon a written finding of pub-
lic interest by the governing body.""7 Also, in the same chapter, the
legislature modified the review procedure for certain subdivisions
within previously adopted master plan areas, where zoning regula-
tions and a development program of public works had been
adopted. These subdivisions would be deemed in the public inter-
est and exempt from the requirement of an environmental
assessment.'8
The court concluded that the amendment to the purpose sec-
tion was designed to make the section consistent with two other
1977 revisions of the act: the amendment in the same bill that
modified the review procedures for some subdivisions in master
plan areas, 9 and the amendment contained in a separate bill that
shortened review procedures for summary subdivisions. 0
The court's conclusion that the bill amending the purpose sec-
tion was designed to create consistency with the summary subdivi-
sion bill is questionable. It is more likely that the legislature's
change in wording in the purpose section to "appropriate approval
of subdivisions" was intended to compensate for only the modified
review procedure for subdivisions in master plan areas which was
enacted in that same bill. Instead, the court concluded that "[t]he
most natural meaning of the clause in the purpose section is that
the appropriate form of approval, whether that be formal approval
or summary approval, is contingent upon a written finding of pub-
lic interest by the governing body."'"
The court's interpretation of legislative intent is overbroad be-
cause of an inconsistency in MCA § 76-3-609 (1979) pertaining to
review procedures for summary subdivisions. Subsection (3) of that
section states that a public hearing and an environmental assess-
ment are not required for the first summary subdivision created
from a single tract. This provision suggests that any subsequent
summary subdivision is subject to the requirements. However, sub-
section (4) states that subsequent subdivisions from a tract of re-
16. 1975 Mont. Laws ch. 448 § 1 (emphasis added).
17. 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 552 § 1 (emphasis added).
18. MCA § 76-3-210(1) (1979).
19. - Mont. -, 590 P.2d at 605.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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cord shall be reviewed under MCA § 76-3-505 (1979), which re-
quires only that local subdivision regulations include provisions for
the review of summary subdivisions. It is unclear whether the act
subjects subsequent summary subdivisions to the requirements of a
public hearing and an environmental assessment. This ambiguity
left open a loophole for subdividers, like those in Florence- Carlton,
who sought to subdivide a group of summary subdivisions within a
larger tract of land. Thus, even though the rationale of Florence-
Carlton is questionable, the result can be justified on policy
grounds as covering a significant loophole in the act.
III. A NEW RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
The decision in Florence-Carlton requiring that both major
and summary subdivisions be found in the public interest was
aided by the concurrent adoption by the Montana Supreme Court
of a new rule of statutory construction. The court expressly
adopted the rule that "[l]egislation enacted for the promotion of
public health, safety, and general welfare, is entitled to 'liberal
construction with a view towards the accomplishment of its highly
beneficent objectives.' "22 In addition, the court adopted the view
that " 'exemptions, provisos, and exceptions'are generally given a
narrow interpretation.' "23 Application of these rules in Florence-
Carlton resulted in the conclusion that the objective of the act as
expressed in the purpose section "must be the primary guide to the
interpretation of the statute. Thus, where no specific exception to
the public interest requirement is mentioned in R.C.M. 1947, § 11-
3866(6),24 the better conclusion is that no such exception is.
intended. '25
This new rule opens the way for judicial expansion of general
welfare statutes under the guise of effecting broad policy state-
ments enacted by the legislature. While emphasizing purpose se-c-
tions to determine legislative intent is consistent with prior Mon-
tana case law, 2 the adoption of the liberal construction rule in
Florence- Carlton is likely to significantly affect interpretations of
other provisions of the subdivision act and recently enacted general
22. Id., quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.01 (4th ed. 1974).
23. Id., quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.01 n.3 (4th ed. 1974).
24. Now codified at MCA § 76-3-609 (1979).
25. - Mont. __, 590 P.2d at 605.
26. The general rule in Montana, most recently stated in Burritt v. City of Butte, 161
Mont. 530, 535, 508 P.2d 563, 566 (1973), is that the goal of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to the purpose of the statute. In Mulholland v. Ayers, 109 Mont. 558, 561, 99 P.2d
234, 237 (1940), the rule for construing statutes was that the court must look first "to the
object and purpose of the statute and the evil sought to be remedied by it."
19801
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welfare statutes such as the Montana Environmental Policy Act, 27
the Clean Air Act,2 and others.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FLORENCE-CARLTON ON SUBDIVISION REVIEW
Florence-Carlton imposes a substantial burden on local gov-
ernments in reviewing small subdivisions by requiring that all sum-
mary subdivisions be determined to be in the public interest. This
conclusion is appropriate in this case where twenty-six summary
subdivisions appeared to have the cumulative effect of a major sub-
division. However, the term "summary subdivision" includes any
division of land creating one or more parcels and resubdivisions of
previously platted areas.29 It is difficult to justify making this deter-
mination for most summary subdivisions. For example, it is highly
unlikely that a two-lot subdivision adjacent to a public road or a
resubdivision of one lot in a previously approved subdivision al-
ready being provided public services will have a negative impact on
any of the eight criteria contained in MCA § 76-3-608(2) (1979).
Furthermore, the process of obtaining information and carefully
considering the eight criteria is time-consuming. The governing
body is given only thirty-five days to approve a summary subdivi-
sion3O and no environmental assessment is required of the subdi-
vider. In contrast, the governing body is given sixty days to ap-
prove a major subdivision," for which a substantial amount of
social and environmental information is provided by the applicant.
Each type of subdivision requires the same analysis and yet the
review period for a major subdivision is nearly twice that of a sum-
mary subdivision. Thirty-five days is hardly enough time to con-
duct an adequate review if all the necessary information is not
readily available. As a result, the public interest determination is
in danger of becoming a useless exercise, a result certainly not in-
tended by the 1975 legislature.
V. CONCLUSION
In holding that all summary subdivisions must be reviewed in
light of eight statutory criteria and found to be in the public inter-
est, the Montana Supreme Court attempted to cover a significant
loophole in the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act. Prior to
Florence- Carlton, the act appeared to allow approval of groups of
27. MCA § 75-1-101 (1979).
28. MCA §§ 75-20-101 et seq. (1979).
29. MCA § 76-3-103 (1979).
30. MCA § 76-3-609(1) (1979).
31. MCA § 76-3-604(2) (1979).
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summary subdivisions created from the same larger tract of land
without a public hearing, an environmental assessment, or a deter-
mination of public interest. In attempting to cover this loophole,
the court greatly increased the burden on local governments in re-
viewing small subdivisions. The better approach would be to
amend the act so that all multiple summary subdivisions are re-
viewed as major subdivisions. The remedy applied to the particular
facts of this case is not undesirable, but the adoption of a uniform
requirement of a public interest determination for every subdivi-
sion is likely to incur procedural difficulties. In addition, the adop-
tion of the liberal construction rule may have consequences that
reach far beyond the Florence-Carlton holding. The rule may dic-
tate more liberal readings of other provisions of the subdivision act
and of other general welfare statutes.
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